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T o begin with, politics is constituted by the everpresent unity of Law and Power, insofar as speaking and desiring subjects have to deal with each 
other within a group. However, this definition is not sufficient because politics 
is also a historical category, i.e. etymologically speaking, bound to the polis. 
Certainly a relation between Law and Power exists also in archaic and tradi­
tional societies, as well as in interpersonal relationships (of erotic, friendly, or 
other kind). But prepolitical relations and micropolitics cannot replace politics 
in the proper sense. The latter is organized around power games and struggles, 
but, what is more, it requires Law and Reason, i.e. the existence of public, 
violence-free situations, which are mediated by speech, whereas the actors 
involved must be individuals, emancipated from exclusive family and particu­
laristic loyalties.
These struggles vary and they often imply some degree of unequality between 
conflicting actors. This unequality, whether of real or imaginary nature, re­
quires rationalization and justification patterns. Y et in comparison to unequality, 
the concept of exclusion seems to be more important; so there are many 
degrees of exclusion; to make history and to simultaneously be the subject 
suffering from history, requires from the subject a continuous effort to over­
come the exclusion (which is a social symptom).
It should be noted that it is above all the will to overcome exclusion, which 
characterizes democratic politics. Yet this cannot be done at any price; what is 
at stake is the way, the »how«, a group or a society tries to overcome 
exclusion, the point being that another exclusion may thus brought about. 
Besides, to overcome the exclusion means to eliminate the excluded rest by an 
appropriate symbolic operation, which substitutes the rest for the acceptance 
of the lack. It also means an endless process which does not sweep away the 
symbolic differences; for they persist and we know that there is no lucky end 
of the lack. But struggle must be distinguished from war: struggle carried out 
with means implying the symbolic order is possible and cannot be eliminated 
from history, whereas war, often practically unavoidable, is however eliminable 
and it always represents a cultural regression.
On the other side an adequate formulation of the Law would be: »Not anything
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is possible«, i.e. psychoanalytically speaking, that the Mother is for all men 
and women the supreme Good as well as the impossible, forbidden Thing. 
Thus the Law protects the subjects from depression and selfdestruction, inso­
far as they are confronted with the hole of the Real. It means that they are also 
protected by the symbolic Difference in opposition to the imaginary polarity 
as well as to the equally imaginary totality/unity.
As a consequence, Law is not identical with Power and political conflict 
(antagonism). Politics can be just determined by the tension between Law and 
Power: the former stems from the Symbolic, the latter from the Imaginary. 
Concrete, positive law is always overdetermined by power relations, but this 
does not exhaust the situation, nor does it occur without contradictions. Be­
sides, there always exists a »struggle for Right«, i.e. the struggle for the 
realization of human rights. The latter can only be grounded on a concept of 
Law and Justice as well as on its difference with Power; on the other side they 
(the rights) cannot be reduced to interests. Obviously we reject here the 
position of Carl Schmitt, from whom politics is defined as the relation between 
friend and foe/enemy, i.e. through a pure imaginary relation. However the 
space of politics is always constructed by power antagonisms and contingen­
cies.
This concept of Law and politics brings to the fore the question of their 
absence in Marxian theory. On the one side, Marx has not developed an 
adequate concept of Law and human subject; on the other side, he oscillates 
between an economistic determinism and a political historicism. The refusal 
of economism, however, should not lead to the opposite error: to an onesided 
»politicism« and a voluntaristic absolutedness of politics. Economics cannot 
be reduced to politics and vice versa. This hangs on the concept of contradic­
tion', since Lacan we are no more obliged to interpret this concept in a usual 
Hegelian manner, i.e. no final conciliation in human history is claimed. But no 
antagonistic, violent, dualistic war is fatal as well. Contradiction and media­
tion are categories of the Symbolic, which always occurs on a real back­
ground. However, it is not necessary for Symbolic and Real to regress back to 
imaginary forms of polarity, so as to destroy an entire society.
According to an onesided and absolutistic interpretation of politics, as a form 
of antagonism, violence might be thought of as harmless. But it is just the myth 
o f violence that marks the problematic aspect of the positions of Marx, Sorel 
and Lenin, since it revealed their apocalyptic-manichean character. A radical 
democratic politics cannot rule out Reason; so far this has been the core 
problem of all revolutionary politics, especially when the deified »Reason« 
(like the terror dominated period during the French revolution). In this case 
voluntaristic politics substituted for religion, whereas the revolutionaries’ 
desire was suffocated within perverse enjoyment during the decapitation ritu-
Ethics and political discourse in democracy 137
als. The same occurred during the era of Stalin, Pol Pot and occurs nowadays 
with the »shining path«.
The »new social movements« can be perceived as a form of an actual radical 
democratic politics; the traditional class question is not as manifestly relevant 
as in the past, but it has not disappeared in the developed countries, it must 
only be reformulated. The significance of these movements does not stem 
from their value relativism and the contingency of their forms. In fact they 
didn’t arise out of thin air, since they are bound to traditional emancipatory 
movements through an interplay of continuity and distanciation. So they are 
marked through ambivalences and contradictions.
The social movements should not be overestimated and idealized; insofar as 
they are driven by antagonistic, particularistic interests and fundamentalisms, 
they are repeating the »errors« of older movements. Their pluralism is not a 
sufficient criterion, whether they have overcome the blindness of a supposedly 
integrated subject.
The social movements which have always raised radical democratic demands, 
have also insisted on the right of being different. Yet, for the most part, they 
have an empiristic conception of difference, which implies ambiguities and 
ambivalences; for instance blacks often stand against whites, women against 
men, homosexuals against heterosexuals and vice versa. It is true also that 
extreme rightist and xenophobic movements are also insisting on the right of 
being different; but they mean the war of one race against the other race and of 
one nation against the other. Thus everybody is defending its own particularis­
tic interests against all the other. In this case we have to do with imaginary 
differences (in plural). What is overlooked is that other Difference (in singu­
lar), which stems from the Symbolic and splits every subject. The subject can 
articulate its own discourse only within the psychoanalytic setting (and its 
equivalents), because it must first resign from putting always the blame on the 
other in order to explain its own discontent.
The difference between the Right and the Left in political discourse stems 
from the symbolic language of the French Revolution, but one can apply this 
difference retrospectively to those cases which concern the political struggles 
between dominant and dominated groups. The political struggle between the 
right and the left is not primary; it has always something imaginary, due to the 
dualistic conflict between the two groups. But it is the difference which arises 
from the exclusion of various groups and individuals that is primary. This 
difference will remain relevant, as long as such exclusions persist.
On the other side there exist also concurrential conflicts within rightist and 
leftist groups themselves: they have to be considered as pure imaginary duels. 
In an imaginary way, the excluded (whether they are the majority of the
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population, or minorities, or a single individual) represent on the social level 
that real rest, which everybody has to confront subjectively. Conversely the 
excluded may also project their own exclusion phantasmatically on the other: 
to every racism corresponds an inverted racism.
It is not easy to speak correctly about politics, at last because there exist other 
fields of human activities as well, though involving it; voluntarists have 
always tried to expand politics everywhere and so to discover it at all places; 
the same occurs with the difference between the right and the left. But if all our 
actions have some political consequences, it is not true that every action is 
intrinsically »political«: this is an important distinction.
A section of the left has traditionally developed a totalitarian relation to 
political action, insofar it repeatedly propagated the slogan »anything is politi­
cal«, i.e. power games. This fundamentalist left is totalitarian, because it 
identifies politics with a total super-ego; but this is a demand which necessar­
ily destroys both politics and ethics. Here a question arises: from which point 
of view do we want to evaluate left actions and attitudes, from a political or 
from an ethical point of view? Besides, there is also another question: does 
there exist »pure« politics and »pure« ethics?
Since antiquity, these two fields are related in a contradictory and »impos­
sible« way. To be sure, efforts were made often to overcome the tension 
between ethical and political discourse through causal reductionism. So in 
classical antiquity: ethics was a duplication of politics, an ethics of civic 
virtues. But the opposite was also to the fore: a politicization of ethics or rather 
of religion. Jewish and Christian currents and sects tried to impose a theocratic 
or apocalyptic politics, in order to equalize various differences under a com­
mon denominator, an attitude which implied fanatism and violence. Tradi­
tional left reproduced these two reductions, dominated as it were by a tyranni­
cal super-ego.
However there is no politics without intrigues, power games and the pleasure 
taken out of them, polemics, lovelessness and the primacy of activism (if not 
actionism): all these features are imaginary, phallic attributes. In opposition to 
these the ethics of love ought to be mentioned, i.e. to listen to the word of the 
Other, to be ready to accept his own weaknesses and his desires. This also 
implies a keeping clear from such statements as »everything is possible to be 
done by action«, »act self-consciously!«, »realize yourself!«.
As to the first question, one can begin with saying that the political difference 
between the right and the left has ceased to play a central role since left wing 
party politics has assimilated right wing party politics and vice versa. Another 
reason has been the undetermining of traditional class division in the devel­
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oped countries through the upward mobility of various social strata. Our theses 
here are the following:
1) Politics cannot exist without one (or more) visible difference, which con­
stitutes it, otherwise it would disappear in an imaginary »unity of the 
people«. But, in opposition to what has happened until now, this difference 
should not be constituted as an imaginary polarity. As we mentioned 
above, this difference by itself does not define politics.
2) In the living political culture there exists a difficulty to define a new visible 
political difference. Many people think they could substitute for political 
differences a moral criterion. So they believe that a »true leftist« is a 
»moral man or woman«. Despite the fact that no politics is possible on a 
pure moral level, such an assertion promotes furthermore the traditional 
self-deification of the left. On the other side, many conservatives and 
liberals could quite rightly assert the same about themselves.
3) Today we all seek the differentia specifica of politics. If we are not willing 
to assume the solution of Carl Schmitt (decisionism and nihilism), we must 
at least accept the contingent character of the political attitude that certain 
social strata adopt. History teaches us that there were times where the 
rightists were following a rationalistic line of thought, whereas the leftists 
were following a romantic one, and vice versa.
4) In their mutual opposition both attitudes constitute a splitted unity, which is 
a trace of the impossible harmony, i.e. the Real. Confronted with the Real, 
the subjects have to choose between two possibilities: either to assume a 
defensive neurotic or perverse attitude, or to recognize the radical lack and 
not try to avoid it. Politically speaking, the first position is reactionary and 
antidemocratic, whereas the second one implies a continuous awareness of 
the openness of society and historical innovation. This distinction displaces 
the right-left difference by the difference between democracy and non 
democracy; perhaps this is the content of today’s politics. Christians, Jews, 
liberals and socialists can belong to the democratic camp, whereas reli­
gious fundamentalists, extreme leftist sectarians and populists do not be­
long to it, because through their aggressive strategies they are refusing to 
recognize the Impossible. So they meet here extreme rightists, reactionary 
conservatives, nationalists and social darwinists. The framework within 
which politics should be practiced today, ought to be guaranteed from the 
democratic left together with democratic and liberal right.
Needless to say that we understand ethics in a non-traditional way. Following 
Lacan the definition of ethical Law is: »You are not allowed to give way on 
your desire«, i.e. you must get repeatedly through the proof of symbolic
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castration and lack. This means also that the above mentioned desire is neither 
a perverse nor a neurotic one. So, one cannot eliminate the Difference and the 
lack, in order to instaure purity, harmony and allmightiness. The difference 
between politics and ethics must remain; politics can only partially be oriented 
towards the Categorical Imperative; but the presence of the latter cannot 
dispense with power games, it can only preserve the hope that those games 
shall be realized without violence and permanent exclusion, and by public and 
reasonable means.
Desire itself cannot choose in an abstract manner between war and peace, 
women and men, economy and ecology, national identity and international­
ism, representative and direct democracy, market and welfare state, state 
apparatus and public space, risk society and insurance society, enlightenment 
and romantics, a.s.o. All these differences are both necessary and uncom­
pleted, whereas their forms can be contingent and historically modified. A 
feature of traditional, metaphysical thinking was the tendency to find its 
origins in static dichotomies and polarities, instead of understanding that 
behind the Difference still exists the Impossible Real, which would annihilate 
any effort to overcome or to fixate this difference. Usually leftists and alterna­
tive movements think in traditional categories. This is because they have 
beeing always perceiving themselves as the one side of an imaginary di­
chotomy: it always has been some manicheanism in this position.
Undoubtedly, it is difficult to develop a conception of left politics based on the 
Unconscious; this is because the Unconscious lays simultaneously on this side 
and beyond politics, so that the latter in the most cases must repulse and deny 
the Unconscious in order to exist. Perhaps political discourse will be always 
dominated by a binary code, which repulses and denies Death, i.e. the Third, 
the symbolic Father and the Law, and this is valid also for the left discourse. 
Apart from this, there is a tendency to play down the sexual difference as well 
as to dissolve any institution into »communicative acts«; moreover desire is 
reduced into »needs« very often. This attitude of »levellers« and »political 
correct« people is however very »in« and is based on the denial of the Real.
Left politics could be defined negatively as the avoidance of all point previ­
ously criticized; it cannot be defined solely by power games, nor through the 
mere cult of ethical values; as we said, the recognition of Law and its tension 
with Power is the constitutional element of politics. It was especially the Law 
which was never »popular« among the leftists, because they stood within a 
Gnostic and apocalyptical tradition, for which the Law was meant to be a mere 
instrument of domination of the Evil. So they understood the Law (in all of its 
forms) in an empiristic and positivistic manner, whereas the Utopians dreamed 
of the »totally other« Law, which revealed itself in reality to be a totalitarian 
Law, since it eliminated every distinction, difference and lack.
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Democracy is the authentic form of politics, but always in an imperfect way; 
in everyday life it often means the sweeping away of the Law and the accep­
tance of the war of all against all. It is a form of social Darwinism which is at 
stake here as well as a variant of »aesthetic Darwinism«, especially wide­
spread among left intellectuals. On the other side democracy stays and falls 
with the chance for Truth to find its place within it. Empirists use to deny this 
question and they are mentioning the catastrophic consequences of the dicta­
torship of the »one«, orthodox truth. But this is not a valid argument against 
the existence of a partial, historical truth, and this is our question here. 
Traditional leftist have always oscillated between a tactical denial of the truth 
and its dogmatic reification, so as to be unable to discover a third solution. 
This is also connected with their relation to institutions, always rejected by 
them. The latter attitude led them to a total, idealistic refusal of power (as long 
as they were in the opposition) and to the denial of the difference between 
democracy and totalitarian institutions.
As far as the intellectuals are concerned, it is very problematic from them to be 
assumed as »mythmakers«, in the sense of Sorel. Quite the opposite is rel­
evant: critical intellectuals should not invent any myths, even if the latter were 
serving democracy. We know how ambivalent and dangerous the democratic 
and the socialist movements can be, because they often spread populist, 
nationalist, fundamentalist and antisemitic ideas against the »other«. So, it 
depends upon historical contingencies whether these tendencies will be real­
ized; but this by no means implies a sort of fatalism. It is only the actuality and 
the will of the opposite forces, which can keep those destructive tendencies 
unrealized. We must insist on the ideas of Reason and human rights, even if, 
for many postmodernists, they are not fashionable today. They just forget that 
one must not give way on his Rights according to Reason. But we would not 
speak about the »myth of Reason«, which is a nonsense; »Mythos« and 
»Logos« are not identical with each other, so the question arised here obliges 
us to take a position against the confusion of concepts.
Myths and ideologies are inevitable. But what does this mean? An anticipated 
absolution of all our errors? Fantasy and the Imaginary are not in themselves 
ideology; they are a necessary support of splitted subjects, confronted as they 
are with the unbearable radical lack of the Real. The function of ideology goes 
beyond fantasy because it makes for a duplication: it represents the illusion o f 
an illusion. But the aim of culture and critique is to overcome ideology again 
and again, and always partially. If individual everyday fantasies represent an 
inevitable support of man’s and woman’s desire (that is the basic illusion), 
ideology signifies a supplementary collective illusion regarding the function­
ing of those fantasies. Every subject is interpellated to live without ideology; 
but it cannot live without any fantasies at all, which are supporting its desire.
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There is a double role to be realized by intellectuals and generally people 
creative in culture (art, religion, philosophy and science); this means a division 
between creative and critical tasks. Philosophy and psychoanalysis are those 
discourses which are radically questioning myths, as well as everyday ideolo­
gies produced by all social groups. If this critical function is missing its goal, 
then we have to do with »ideologists«, i.e. producers of ideology, who repro­
duce existent power relations and illusions. This is true also if these people 
seem to be »progressive« or »alternative«. Critique always means selfcritique 
too (which of course reaches the limits of politics and goes beyond it).
Furthermore, persons who are dealing with culture are creative. One can be 
creative in two senses: either in an analytical or in a metaphorical sense; in the 
first case we have to do with Logos, in the second one with Mythos. Analytical 
discourse becomes manifested as the critical theory of the values, whereas the 
metaphorical discourse is manifested itself in fiction and poetry. Here the 
concepts of mythos and logos should be liberated from a secular and sterile 
controversy which put them in opposition to each other. This controversy 
occurs insofar as reason and poetry can drift in the imaginary, when they 
establish a lack of freedom. In this case we are speaking of »instrumental« 
instead of critical reason; besides, there exists a radical difference between 
»obscurantistic« and violent myth, which seduces the subject into the belief in 
fetishes, masters and enemies, and poetical myth. Of course all these forms 
can coexist.
Here we have to do with a double distinction; between these four ideal typical 
cases there exists a transition. Psychoanalysis itself teaches us how to deal 
with Logos (theory) as well as with Mythos (the laws and formations of the 
Unconscious). In the cultural field artists and writers are producing myths, but 
not ideology, insofar as they are not totally dependent on the mass media. But 
these myths are circumscribing the real lack without making a fetish out of it. 
Therefore ideology is that discourse which is reproducing violent and 
obscurantistic myths as well as the instrumental rationality of modernity, 
precisely both on the right and on the left side of the political spectrum.
Finally, we must proceed towards the actual postmodern crisis of politics as 
well as of the Law. There are a lot of reasons for it and we would like to 
mention some of them. The domination of the discourses of knowledge under 
the form of developmental, productivist and consumerist ideology implies the 
repulsion of non material and non utilitarian values. Politics is here reduced to 
objective administration of interests, so that the symbolic dimension of the 
Law has disappeared from the terrain of politics; thus the latter is loosing its 
aura and is becoming banalised. Moreover, a certain leftist, antiauthoritarian, 
hysterical critique led to a denial of the Law, because it rejected every demand 
for certain rules and differences as authoritarian.
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At the same time the symbolic function of the Father, the Name-of-the-Father 
has been discredited. These tendencies have been diffused at the level of 
everyday ideologies and mentalities, both from liberals and leftists, whereas 
the mass media popularized them. This didn’t remain without consequences. 
People, especially the young people, do not expect a change in their life from 
the political groups and the trade unions. The crisis of the Law and of the name 
of the father implies also a general increase of anomy, criminality and cyni­
cism. So, many people are taking refuge into a defensive attitude, which 
favorizes anew hard ideologies like mysticism, nationalism, racism and funda­
mentalism. There is a danger here for politics to disappear through the rise of a 
new discourse of the master and of hysteria, thus reproducing obscurantistic 
and violent myths.
The way out of this blind alley is a detour: politics cannot be understood out of 
itself, it exists only through its symbolic difference from culture; actually we 
are lacking a new, persuasive definition of Law. What we need is a non violent 
cultural revolution or reformation. The difference between politics and culture 
is important in order to avoid politics to become a substitute for religion. Still 
we must not forget the middle ages division between the state and the church, 
which has been the first condition of England’s and Europe’s freedom. So 
»politics is not all« and »not everything is politics«, there still exists something 
»eise«.
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